Nine hundred case histories of malfunctioning towers reported over the last 50 years were surveyed and analyzed. Our analysis shows rapid growth in the number of malfunctions with no signs of decline. Plugging, especially of tray active areas, packing and distributors, tops the malfunctions list. Coking (refinery towers only), scale and corrosion, and precipitation were the most common causes. The tower base comes second, where liquid level rising above the reboiler inlet caused premature flood and even internals damage. Attention to level measurement and kettle reboiler pressure balance are key preventive measures. Next follow tower internals damage, abnormal operation incidents (startup, shutdown, commissioning), assembly mishaps, packing liquid distributors, intermediate draws, misleading measurements, reboilers, and explosions. Tray design and tower simulation, two topics that receive much attention in the literature, are not high up on the malfunction list. The survey teaches numerous lessons on each of the malfunctions which are invaluable for achieving trouble-free design and operation of distillation towers.
rise and accelerating.The objective of our 1997 survey was to project into the 21st century by comparing the 1990s malfunctions with those that prevailed in the four preceding decades. Our focus was to identify the trends, and to flag major regions of growing malfunctions. For instance, our survey flagged an alarming growth rate in poor installation mishaps. To these findings, we do not have much to add in the current survey.
In contrast to projecting into the 21st century, the current survey reflects back to the last five decades, seeking out the malfunctions that repeatedly and most commonly caused towers to fall short of achieving their objective. Lessons learnt from past malfunctions can save engineers and operators from falling into traps where people fell before. They can also help troubleshooters identify root causes of operating problems. It is amazing how repetitious the case histories are. Table A provides an example. All the case histories listed involve premature floods resulting from liquid levels rising above the reboiler return inlet due to a faulty level indication. How many more times does this type of malfunction need to be reported before designers and operators learn the importance of ensuring adequate level indication (e.g., by adequate maintenance, checking, and redundant instrumentation)?
CURRENT SURVEY
In this work, 300 additional case studies that came to the author's attention in the last five years were added to the previously abstracted 600. The abstracts for the earlier case studies are in references 1 and 2. The author wished to publish the abstracts of the 300 additional cases with this paper, but the maximum page limit precluded him from doing so. These cases will be published in a companion paper [13] .
The complete data base now has 900 case histories. Of these, about half were reported in the last decade, the other half were reported in the four preceding decades. The finding is well in line with a projection from our 1997 survey [2] that the number of malfunctions reported per year has been about 5 times higher in the last decade than in the four preceding decades. Also, the split between the sources of case histories is much the same as that reported earlier [2] ; i.e., 40% from refineries, 40% from chemicals, and the remaining 20% from olefins and gas plants (denoted O/G in the tables).
PLUGGING, COKING
With 121 case histories, Table 1 has plugging/coking as the undisputed leader of tower malfunctions. The number of plugging/coking incidents reported over the last decade is higher than that reported over the previous four decades, suggesting that these problems are neither easing off nor declining. Plugging/coking is here to stay, and most likely will continue to top the tower malfunction list. More plugging/coking cases have been reported in refineries than in chemical plants, probably due to the incidence of coking, which is a major problem in refineries but uncommon in chemical towers. A faulty level indicator caused the column to fill up with liquid. Two days later, asphalt and tar were found in the upper products and the pressure drop across the bottom four sieve trays rose from 0.07-0.14 bars to 0.6 bars, indicating plugging. Plugging confirmed by gamma scans.
Same as 1520.
9 Refinery
Combination tower Bottom liquid level rose above the vapor inlet nozzles because of a faulty level controller. The submergence backpressured the coke drum upstream. When the operator noticed this, he quickly lowered the bottom level. This caused foamover (a "champagne bottle" effect) in the coke drum.
Same as 1520. Avoid excessively rapid draining of column liquid. Table 3 shows that 17 out of the 26 coking case histories were experienced in refinery vacuum towers. Of these 17, eleven were due to insufficient reflux to the wash bed. This wash bed removes the heavy ends ("asphaltenes") and organometallic compounds from the hot feed vapor by contacting the vapor with a volatile reflux stream. If insufficient, dry spots form in the wash bed and coke up. The problem of insufficient reflux reflects a learning curve problem associated with deepcutting the residue, a technology that emerged over the last decade. Closely following coking, scale and corrosion products is the leading cause of plugging (Table 2) , with 22 case histories. The case histories are split evenly between the last decade and the previous four, and appear to be more of a problem in refinery and olefins/gas towers than in chemical towers. Precipitation or salting out follows closely behind with 17 case histories. Precipitation appears to have become more of a problem recently, possibly due to a trend to use lower-quality feedstocks and to minimize plant effluent, and affects both chemical and refinery towers. The next two common causes of plugging, with nine to ten case histories, are solids in the tower feed and polymerization. Solids in the feed and polymer formation are more of a problem in chemical than in refinery towers. In fact, no polymer formation case histories have been reported in refinery towers. Table 4 details locations where plugging was reported. The case histories are evenly split between packed and tray towers. Both packings and distributors plug up. The large number of coking incidents in wash beds of refinery vacuum towers biases Table 4 toward bed plugging compared to distributor plugging. In other services, the case histories are evenly split between plugged packings and plugged distributors. In trays, cases of plugged active areas outnumber those of plugged downcomers by more than 3 to 1, suggesting that improving tray design for fouling service should focus on enhancing fouling resistance in the active areas.
Although most plugs take place in the tower, draw lines, instrument lines, and even feed lines, plug too. Line plugging appears to be less of a problem in chemical towers than in refinery and olefins/gas towers. 
TOWER BASE AND REBOILER RETURN
Layton Kitterman, one of the all time greats in distillation troubleshooting, estimated that 50% of the problems in the tower originate in this region [14] . With 103 case histories, Table 1 verifies that indeed, more problems initiate at the tower base than in any other tower region, although the actual percentage is lower than 50. The number of tower base incidents reported over the last decade is much the same as that reported in the previous four, suggesting little improvement over the years. The tower base will continue to be a major troublespot. Tower base problems bother refineries more than chemical plants. Table 5 gives a breakdown. 49 case histories, half of those reported, were of liquid level rising above the reboiler return inlet or the bottom gas feed. Table 6 details the causes of these high levels. Faulty level measurement or control tops this list, but restriction in the outlet line (this includes loss of bottom pump, obstruction by debris, and undersized outlets) and excess reboiler pressure drop are also important. Almost all of the cases of excess reboiler pressure drop are for kettle reboilers, with liquid level in the tower base backing up beyond the reboiler return to overcome the pressure drop. With reboilers other than kettles, high pressure drop seldom causes excessive tower base levels.
In the vast majority of cases, high tower base levels caused tower flooding, instability, and poor separation. Less frequently (8 cases out of the 49), vapor slugging through the liquid also caused tray or packing uplift and damage. The corrective measures to prevent excessive tower base level are those recommended by Ellingsen [15] : reliable level monitoring, often with redundant instrumentation, and good sump design. Based on the current survey, the author adds avoiding excessive kettle reboiler pressure drop to that list.
With far fewer case histories, 13, vapor maldistribution is the second most common tower base malfunction (Table 5) . Almost all these case histories were reported in packed towers, evenly split between refinery and chemical towers. Vapor maldistribution in the reboiler return region is an uncommon issue with tray towers.
Impingement by the reboiler return or incoming gas is next with 10 case histories, almost all recent. Four of the ten report severe local corrosion due to gas flinging liquid at the tower shell in alkaline absorbers fed with CO 2 -rich gas, mostly in ammonia plants. This calls for special caution with the design of gas inlets into these towers. Troublesome experiences were also reported with inlet gas impingement on liquid level, instruments, the bottom tray, the seal pan overflow, and the inlet from a second reboiler.
Four other troublespots follow with 6 to 8 case histories. These are gas entrainment in the bottom liquid, low base levels, water-induced pressure surges, and leaking draws to once-through reboilers. Gas entrainment led to pump cavitation or contributed to base level rise above the vapor inlet. Low base levels appear to be particularly troublesome in chemical towers. In services distilling unstable compounds like peroxides, low base levels induced excessive temperatures or peroxide concentration, either of which led to explosions. A total loss of liquid level induced vapor flow out of the bottom which overpressured storages.
All the reported water-induced pressure surges and leaking draws to once-through thermosiphon reboilers came from refinery towers. Most of the water-induced pressure surges initiating at the tower base were due to undrained stripping steam lines. With once-through thermosiphons, bottom tray liquid is collected by a sump or draw pan, then flows through the reboiler into the tower base. The bottom product is reboiler effluent liquid collected at the tower base. Any liquid leaking or weeping from the sump or bottom tray shortcuts the reboiler into the tower base, which starves the reboiler of liquid. This leakage is the most common problem with the once-through thermosiphon reboilers, as evidenced by 6 case histories.
DAMAGE TO TOWER INTERNALS
With 84 case histories (Table 1) , tower internals damage has been the third most common tower malfunction. Unlike plugging and coking, however, the number of damage case histories reported in the last decade is lower than in the past, suggesting that the industry is making progress in reducing these malfunctions. Tower internals damage is equally troublesome in refinery and chemical towers, but appears less of a problem in olefins/gas plant towers. Table 7 details the main causes of internals damage. One cause towers above the others: water-induced pressure surges, accounting for 26 of the case histories reported, almost all from refinery towers. The good news is that these pressure surges are very much on the decline, with only 8 cases reported in the last decade compared to 18 in the four preceding decades. Much of the progress here can be attributed to AMOCO, who experienced their share of pressure surges in the 1960's. AMOCO investigated these cases very thoroughly, and shared their experiences and lessons learned with the industry by publishing three superb booklets -"The Hazards of Water," "The Hazards of Steam," and "Safe Ups and Downs" (16) (17) (18) . Table 8 gives a split of these cases. The key to prevention is keeping the water out. The leading route of entry is undrained stripping steam lines, but other causes also listed in Table 8 are not far behind. Returning to Table 7 , after water-induced pressure surges with 26 reported case histories, there is a large gap. With 10 case histories, insufficient mechanical resistance is the second leading cause of tower internals damage. All the reported cases are recent; in fact, in the last decade insufficient mechanical resistance has surpassed water-induced pressure surges as the top cause of tower internals damage. This finding suggests that in services prone to damage, "heavy-duty" internals design, as described in Shieveler's article [19] , can offer much improvement. Many of the damage incidents took place during abnormal operation, such as startup, shutdown, commissioning and outages. During these operations, special caution is required to prevent water entry into a hot oil tower, excessive base level, rapid pressuring or depressuring that can uplift trays, downward pressuring on valve trays, and overheating of plastic packings.
The relatively low incidence of cases of damage due to high liquid level at the tower base is somewhat surprising, in light of earlier reports that high base levels account for as many as half the tray damage cases in chemical towers [15] . The current survey verifies that high base level is a major cause of internals damage, but it accounts for well below half of incidents.
ABNORMAL OPERATION INCIDENTS (COMMISSIONING, STARTUP, SHUTDOWN)
The 84 incidents induced by commissioning, startup, and shutdown, place abnormal operation in equal third place in Table 1 . These malfunctions are spread evenly throughout chemical, refinery and olefins/gas towers. Quite a few of these led to plugging/coking and internals damage. The good news is that the abnormal operation incidents reported in the last decade are less than half of those reported for the four preceding decades. The industry has made good progress in reducing these malfunctions. This progress was reported in our previous work [2] , appears to continue, and can be attributed to greater emphasis on safety by most major corporations.
Hazops and "what-if" analyses, safety audits, improved procedures and extensive safety training have all contributed to this very welcome progress. Table 9 shows that three malfunctions account for about half the case histories: blinding/unblinding, backflow, and water removal from refinery fractionators. Water removal incidents are closely linked to water-induced pressure surges which tops the causes of tower internals damage. Of the 26 cases of water-induced pressure surges, about half were induced by startup, shutdown and abnormal operation; vice versa, of the 15 incidents associated with water removal, 12 resulted in pressure surges. Refineries implement special procedures to remove water prior to startup of their hot oil fractionators, but if something goes wrong, a pressure surge often results.
There is some overlap between blinding/unblinding and backflow; in five case histories, poor blinding led to a backflow incident. Both blinding and backflow incidents led to chemical releases, explosions, fires and personnel injuries. Highpressure absorbers account for five of the backflow incidents. Here loss or shutdown of the lean solvent pump resulted in backflow of high-pressure gas into the lean solvent line, from where it found a path to atmosphere or storage. Four other incidents reported flow from storage or flare into the tower while maintenance was in progress. Three blinding incidents involved valves that were plugged or frozen.
Washing and steam/water operations are common commissioning operations, yet quite troublesome. Each accounts for 10 to 12 case histories. Most malfunctions in washing led to fouling and corrosion, but in some cases, washing liberated toxic gas or transported chemicals into undesirable locations. Most malfunctions generated by steam/water operations either led to rapid depressuring in the condensation zone, or to overheating. Rapid depressuring in the condensation zone, in turn, either led to vacuum and implosion or to excessive flows and internals damage as vapor from above and below rushed towards the depressured zone.
For all four operations (blinding/unblinding, backflow, washing, steam/water operations) the number of malfunctions reported over the last decade is well below the past number. Also, all four are quite evenly split between refinery and chemical towers. These four operations plus the water removal account for about 70% of the reported abnormal operation incidents. Overheating is next in Table 9 with seven case histories, none of which took place in the last decade. Some cases resulted from steaming, but there are also other causes, like failure of the cooling medium in a heat-integrated system during an outage. Following overheating, there are four operations with four to six malfunctions: pressuring or depressuring, overchilling, purging and cooling. Pressuring and depressuring caused internals damage if too rapid or if performed backwards via valve trays. The main cooling malfunctions involve condensation which induced air into the tower or formed a zone of rapid depresurization. The malfunctions of purging are varied.
The final item, overchilling, deserves special discussion. While all the abnormal operation malfunctions in Table 9 show a marked decline in the last decade, overchilling shows a rise. Five out of the six reported overchilling cases occurred in olefins or gas plant towers, the sixth being a refinery case. Recognizing that the total number of case histories reported in Table 9 by olefins and gas plants is 13 , it can be appreciated that for towers in this industry, overchilling is the major abnormal operation malfunction. Moreover, overchilling had led to brittle failure, releasing gas clouds, which had been responsible for major explosions, accompanied by loss of life, injuries and major destruction. The rise in overchilling case histories is the only setback, yet a major concern, to the progress achieved in reducing abnormal operation malfunctions.
ASSEMBLY MISHAPS
With 75 case histories, assembly mishaps are in the fifth spot in Table 1 . Our 1997 survey [2] singled out assembly mishaps as the fastest growing malfunction, with the number of malfunctions reported between 1990 and 1997 more than double the number of malfunctions between 1950 and 1990. The good news is that this growth has leveled off. The number of assembly mishaps reported in the last decade is roughly the same as that reported in the four preceding decades. It appears that the industry took corrective action after noticing the alarming rise in assembly mishaps. Many major organizations have initiated systematic and thorough tower process inspection programs, and these are paying good dividends. Sharing the top spot in Table 10 is incorrect packing assembly. This item is higher than it deserves to be. It has been inflated into the top spot by a relatively high number of incidents from fairly uncommon packing assemblies. Out of the 13 cases reported, two describe breakage of packings, which is troublesome with ceramics but rare with metal packings; two others describe disintegration of a poorly-fastened grid bed; another four had the pre-revamp tray support rings left in the tower (only one of these four is known to have caused a major loss in packing efficiency). All these are fairly uncommon specific applications, which should not reflect on the majority of packing assemblies. This split calls for special caution in specific situations like dumping ceramic packings, fastening grid, and when deciding whether to leave the tray support rings in the towers. With eight to nine incidents, improper tightening of nuts, bolts and clamps, and incorrect assembly of tray panels, are, as can be expected, near the top of the assembly mishaps, and deserve to be on the checklist of every tower inspector. Debris left in the column, and incorrect materials of construction also belong on the same checklist.
The rest of the entries in Table 10 show malfunctions that tend to repeat themselves far more frequently than others. These spell out some of the items that the process inspector should focus on. Flow passage obstruction and internals misorientation in feed and draw areas is common. The possibility of leakage from "leak-proof" and "leak resistant" collector trays should be considered and water-tested at turnarounds. Finally, two very common flaws must never be overlooked in tray tower installations: downcomer clearances improperly set and tray manways left unbottled.
PACKING LIQUID DISTRIBUTORS
After the tower base, liquid distributors are the second most troublesome internal in distillation towers, with a total of 74 case histories ( Table 1 ). The number of liquid distributor malfunctions reported in the last decade is almost double that in the preceding four decades, probably because of the wide use of packed towers in the industry over the last couple of decades.
More distributor malfunctions have been reported in chemical towers than in refinery and olefins/gas towers, probably due to the comparatively wider application of packings in chemicals. In chemical towers alone, liquid distributor malfunctions outnumber any of the previous malfunctions including plugging, tower base, internals damage and abnormal operation. Liquid distributors are the top malfunction in chemical towers. Table 11 provides a breakdown of the distributor malfunctions. The two majors (17 to 20 cases) reported are plugging and overflow. While plugging is a common cause of overflows, only five of the 17 cases of overflows reported were due to plugging. Distributor overloading by excessive liquid loads, insufficient orifice area, and hydraulic problems with the feed entry into a distributor caused the rest of the overflow cases.
The next two major malfunctions (13 to 14 cases) were poor irrigation quality and fabrication/ installation mishaps. It is surprising that poor irrigation quality accounts for only 20% of the liquid distributor malfunctions. The literature on liquid distributors has focused on optimizing irrigation quality, yet other more troublesome items, like plugging and overflow prevention, received little attention. Further, the number of irrigation quality malfunctions reported is on the decline, suggesting the industry has learnt to produce good irrigation, at least in most cases. On the other hand, cases of distributor overflow, fabrication and installation mishaps, and feed entry problems, are sharply on the rise, so the industry should focus on improving these.
Feed entry malfunctions (11 cases) comes next, followed by poor hole pattern and distributor damage (eight cases). It is worth noting that distributor damage is the only item in Table 11 for which the number of refinery malfunctions exceeded the chemical malfunctions. Some items such as irrigation quality, feed entry and hole pattern seldom appear on the refinery malfunction list.
Redistribution, handling flashing feeds, out-of-levelness and insufficient mixing (four to five cases) constitute the remaining entries in Table 11 . It is worth noting that distributor out-of-levelness, which is frequently suspected when a tower malperforms, is one of the minor entries in Table 11 . Finally, insufficient mixing is a size-related issue, seldom troublesome in smaller towers (<5 m ID), but rises in significance with larger diameter. Table 11 provides support for recommendations by Olsson [20] for minimizing distributor malfunctions. Olsson advocates critically examining the fouling potential and absence of vaporization in streams entering the distributor, testing distributors by running water through them at the design rates, either in the shop or in-situ, and finally, ensuring adequate process inspection. Table 11 suggests that Olsson's measures would have prevented more than 80 to 90% of the reported malfunctions. 
INTERMEDIATE DRAWS
With 68 case histories ( Table 12 shows that 35 of the 68 cases occurred in chimney trays, 31 in downcomer trapouts (including draw-boxes). The other two involve vapor side draws. About half the reported cases involved either leakage at the draw or restriction to the exiting liquid. Leakage was a greater problem in total draw chimney trays, that need to be leak-proof, while restriction to the exiting liquid was more of a problem with downcomer trapouts that are short of residence time to degas the liquid. Trapped gas bubbles often choke outlet lines or aggravate a restriction problem. Other malfunctions in Table 12 are plugging/coking and level measurement, each with six to seven case histories. It is incredible that people are attempting to measure liquid level on partial draw trays, but these are real cases. Finally, there are four cases reported in which vapor from chimneys impinged on the seal pan overflow or on the tray liquid. 
MISLEADING MEASUREMENTS
With 64 case histories (Table 1) , misleading measurements range from those leading to minor headaches when validating a simulation, to major contributors to explosions and accidents. The problem is ongoing, with the number of case histories reported in the last decade much the same as the number reported in the past. In proportion, Table 1 shows an abnormally low number of misleading measurements in chemical towers compared to those in refinery and olefins/gas towers. This does not match our experience. We have seen chemical towers in which we could not trust a single meter.
Incorrect measurements featured in 17 reported case histories (Table 13 ). In five cases, incorrect levels and control valve position indicators led to discharge of flammable liquid to the flare or fuel gas. Two of these discharges led to accidents with injuries or loss of life, two more to a fire, the fifth remained a near-miss. In four cases, incorrect level indications caused pump cavitation, some with damage. Nonoptimum operation resulted from the remaining incorrect measurements. This finding emphasizes the importance of independent validation of level measurements, especially where there is a risk of flammable liquid discharge or pump cavitation. A "what if" or hazop analysis should address what will happen if a level measurement fails.
Fooling of a level instrument by froth or lighter liquid comes next, with 12 case histories. It is surprising to find this issue so high up in Table 13 . This fooling is a major issue with some services, such as amine absorbers (three of the 12 cases), where either foam or hydrocarbon condensation in the tower base lowers the density of the tower base fluid below normal. In two other cases, an interface level measurement failed, probably due to emulsification or poor phase settling. Two other cases were attempts doomed to failure to measure liquid level on partial draw trays. The rest of the cases except one took place in foaming systems. So while in the specific situations mentioned, fooling of the level instrument is a major issue, in other services this is seldom troublesome.
Plugged instrument taps or lines and incorrect location of instruments follow, each with nine case histories. The consequences of plugged taps and incorrectly located instruments were similar to incorrect measurements (above). Four case histories resulted in explosions, four others in near misses, and the other ten in non-optimum operation. Incorrect calibration and incorrect installation are other items in Table 13 .
The encouraging news is that out of the 64 case histories, only nine (about 15%) are due to the absence of a meter when one is needed. In most cases, the meters are there. However, to minimize misleading measurements they need to be continuously validated and properly installed, checked and inspected. 
REBOILER MALFUNCTIONS
With 62 case histories (Table 1) , reboilers are the most troublesome auxiliary equipment in a distillation system. The number of cases reported in the last decade is much the same as that reported for the four preceding decades. Fewer reboiler malfunctions were reported for chemical towers compared to refineries and gas plants. This is because two of the more troublesome reboiler types, the once-through thermosiphon and the kettle reboiler, are uncommon in chemical plants. Table 14 breaks down these cases. Circulating thermosiphons, by far the most common type of reboiler, account for only about one fifth of the troublesome case histories. This indicates quite a trouble-free performance which has characterized this reboiler type. The malfunctions reported are varied. They include excessive circulation causing loss of heat transfer or tower flooding; insufficient ∆T and resulting pinches; surging due to presence of a small quantity of low-boilers in the tower base, and others.
Even though kettle reboilers are far less common than thermosiphons, the number of kettle reboiler malfunctions in Table 14 exceeds that of circulating thermosiphons. Excess pressure drop in kettle reboiler circuits is the dominant malfunction (12 out of the 15 case histories), causing liquid to back up in the tower base beyond the reboiler return elevation. This high liquid level leads to premature flood and capacity loss. Kettle reboilers whose pressure drops are OK are seldom troublesome.
A very similar situation applies to once-through thermosiphons, the next item in Table  14 . Nine case studies for this very uncommon reboiler type signify a very troublesome reboiler. Yet, like the kettle, six of the nine cases describe one dominant malfunction: leakage at the liquid draw that feeds the reboiler. This was discussed earlier in reference to the tower base malfunctions. Forced circulation and internal reboilers have spots in Table 14 , each with four or five case histories. For internal reboilers, which are infrequently used, four cases is quite high, so they can be regarded quite troublesome. Also in Table 14 are side reboilers of various types, with five cases. Finally, ten cases concern the condensing side of reboilers heated by latent heat, where accumulation of inerts (six cases) or problems with condensate draining (four cases) are occasionally troublesome. No heating-side malfunctions were reported for the heating side of sensible-heated reboilers.
CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS
Chemical explosions occupy the tenth spot in Table 1 , with 53 case histories. The words "chemical explosion" are used here to distinguish from explosions due to rapid vaporization, e.g., when a pocket of water enters a hot oil tower. Table 15 gives a breakdown. Just over half of the explosions in our survey were initiated by exothermic decomposition reactions. Of the 27 decomposition-initiated explosions, seven were reported in ethylene oxide towers, six in peroxide towers, five in nitro compound towers, and three in sulphoxide towers. The remaining six came from a variety of towers. Decomposition-initiated explosions are associated with specific services. In these services, excessive temperatures (either a hot spot or a high tower base temperature) or excessive concentration of an unstable component initiated the decomposition. In some cases, the excessive temperature resulted from a rise in pressure due to rapid generation of non-condensables by a decomposition reaction. In others, precipitation or low base levels led to the concentration of an unstable component at the hot temperature. Catalysis by metal or catalyst fines and by air leaks have also contributed to some decomposition explosions.
The good news about decomposition explosions is that the number of case histories reported appears to be on the way down, with 19 explosions reported before 1991, and less than half of this number reported in the last decade.
Line fractures is the next leading cause of chemical explosions, with 13 case histories (Table 15 ). All cases, except one, were of lines carrying light hydrocarbons ranging from C 1 to C 4 , and their fracture led to the formation of vapor clouds that ignited and exploded. Unlike decomposition reaction explosions, which appear to be on the decline, the number of line fracture explosions had been much the same over the last decade compared to that before 1991. Half the reported cases came from either gas or olefins towers, indicating that line fracture is a major issue in those towers. The other half came from refinery towers.
Less common, yet important causes of explosions in towers are commissioning operations and hydrocarbon releases, each with five to six case histories. Most all these case histories were reported before 1991. In all the reported commissioning cases, an operation such as purging, flushing, or deinventorying, led to the formation of an explosive mixture. Three of the five cases under hydrocarbon/chemical release involved releasing C 4 hydrocarbons trapped in a plugged or frozen valve. Finally, violent chemical reactions led to three explosions, all prior to 1991.
This section of the survey emphasizes the requirement for extremely cautious design, operation and maintenance in towers handling compounds prone to exothermic runaway decomposition or violent reactions, and in light hydrocarbons (especially C 1 -C 4 ) towers. Lessons drawn from previous accidents and near-misses must be incorporated into existing and new facilities. Although other services reported fewer explosions, the possibility of their occurrence should always be considered, and the appropriate preventive measures incorporated. 
FOAMING
Foaming is 11 th in Table 1 , with 51 case histories. Unlike most of the other malfunctions, foaming is a service-specific phenomenon. Table 16 lists the services in which foaming was reported. About 35% of the cases reported were in ethanolamine absorbers and regenerators that absorb acid gases such as H 2 S and CO 2 from predominantly hydrocarbon gases. Another 10% were also in acid gas absorption service, but using alternative solvents such as hot potassium carbonate (hot-pot), caustic and sulfinol. Another 10% were in absorbers that use a hydrocarbon solvent to absorb gasoline and LPG from hydrocarbon gases. Since these services are most common in refineries and gas plants, more foaming cases originate from these industries than from chemicals (Table 1 ). There does not appear to be much change between the number of cases reported over the last decade and those reported in the previous four.
In addition to Table 16 , one case history of foaming was reported in each of the following services: chemical: aldehyde column, soapy water/polyalcohol oligomer, solvent residue batch still, ammonia stripper, DMF absorber (mono-olefins separation from diolefins), cold water H 2 S contactor (heavy water GS process), refinery: crude stripping, visbreaker fractionator, coker fractionator, hydrocracker depropanizer, gas: sulfinol absorber, glycol contactor, olefins: high pressure condensate stripper. Table 17 surveys factors that induced or promoted foaming. In about 30 % of the reported cases, solids catalyzed foaming. Solids could have catalyzed foaming in many of the others, but this was not specifically reported in the other cases. In eight cases, the foaming was caused or catalyzed by an additive such as a corrosion inhibitor. Hydrocarbon condensation into aqueous solutions, certain feedstocks, small downcomers, and low temperatures were reported to promote foaming. The additives and hydrocarbon condensation appear to be most troublesome in olefins/gas towers.
SIMULATIONS
Simulations is next in the 12 th spot in Table 1 with 47 case histories, most of which were reported in the last decade. Simulations have been more troublesome in chemical than in refinery towers, probably due to the difficulty in simulating chemical non-idealities. The subject was discussed in detail elsewhere [21] . Table 18 shows that the three major issues that affect simulation validity are using good VLE predictions, obtaining a good match between the simulation and plant data, and using graphical techniques to troubleshoot the simulation. Case histories involving these issues account for about 2/3 of the cases reported in the literature. Add to this ensuring correct chemistry and correct tray efficiency, these items account for 85% of the cases reported in the literature.
An in-depth review of the VLE case [21] reveals three major troublespots. Most cases involved close-boiling components, either a pair of chemicals (e.g., hydrocarbons) of similar vapor pressures, or a non-ideal pair close to an azeotrope. Correctly estimating non-idealities has been another VLE troublespot. A third troublespot is characterization of heavy components in crude oil distillation. This is a major troublespot in simulating refinery vacuum towers. Very few case histories were reported with other systems. It appears that VLE prediction for reasonably high volatility systems (e.g., ethane-propane, or methanol-ethanol) is not frequently troublesome.
The major problem in simulation validation appears to be obtaining a reliable, consistent set of plant data. Getting correct numbers out of flowmeters and laboratory analyses appears to be a major headache requiring extensive checks and rechecks. Compiling mass, component and energy balances is essential for catching a misleading flowmeter or composition. One specific area of frequent mismatches between simulation and plant data is where there are two liquid phases. Here comparison of measured to simulated temperature profiles is invaluable for finding the second liquid phase. Another specific area of frequent mismatches is refinery vacuum towers. Here the difficult measurement is the liquid entrainment from the flash zone into the wash bed, which is often established by a component balance on metals or asphaltenes.
The key graphical techniques for troubleshooting simulations are the McCabe-Thiele and Hengstebeck diagrams, multicomponent distillation composition profiles, and in azeotropic systems, residue curve maps. These techniques permit visualization and insight into what the simulation is doing. These diagrams are not drawn from scratch; they are plots of the composition profiles obtained by the simulation using the format of one of these procedures. The book by Stichlmair and Fair [22] is loaded with excellent examples of graphical techniques shedding light on tower operation. In chemical towers, reactions such as decomposition, polymerization and hydrolysis are often unaccounted for by a simulation. Also, the chemistry of a process is not always well understood. One of the best tools for getting a good simulation in these situations is to run the chemicals through a mini plant as recommended by Ruffert [23] .
In established processes, such as separation of benzene from toluene or ethanol from water, estimating efficiency is quite trouble-free in conventional trays and packings. Problems are experienced in a first-of-a-kind process or when a new mass transfer device is introduced and is on the steep segment of its learning curve.
LEAKS
Leaks are in the 13 th place in Table 1 with 41 case histories. Table 1 shows that leaks are equally troublesome in chemical, refinery and gas/olefins towers, and have been equally troublesome in the four decades preceding 1991 as in the last decade. Table 19 lists the most troublesome leaks. Heat exchanger leaks top the list with 16 case histories. Of the 16, nine were reboiler tube leaks including two cases from fired reboilers. Six were leaks in preheaters and pumparound exchangers, most in refineries, and only one was a condenser tube leak. Most of the exchanger tube leaks led to product contamination. In two, the leak also led to instability. In one case, it led to rapid vaporization pressure surge, and in one to overchilling and an explosion. In at least one of the two fired reboiler cases, the tube leak led to a fire.
Closely following the heat exchanger leaks are leaks of chemicals to atmosphere or air into the tower. Of the 13 atmospheric leaks, four led to explosions, one to a fire, while six discharges of flammable materials remained near-misses. With six case histories, two other types of leaks follow: chemicals leaking in/out of the tower from/to other equipment, and seal/oil leaks from pumps and compressors. Of the six chemical leaks reported, one led to an explosion with unstable chemicals, one to a fatal accident, and two to major damage. It appears that leaks into or out of the tower, whether to/from atmosphere or to/from other equipment are some of the prime safety hazards in towers. Consequences of the compressor/pump seal leaks were less severe, although one caught fire and another led to a pressure surge, damaging tower internals. 
CONDENSERS
Condensers are in the 15 th place in Table 1 with 31 case histories, evenly split between chemical, refinery and olefins/gas towers. Of these 19 were reported before 1991, and 12 in the last decade, indicating a slight decline in condenser malfunctions. Table 20 gives the breakdown. Two major headaches with condensers, namely condenser fouling and corrosion, have been excluded from our survey, being primarily functions of the system, impurities, and metallurgy. Fouling and corrosion have only been included in our survey if induced or enhanced by a process, equipment or operational reason. A famous statement made by Smith [24] is that to troubleshoot a condenser one needs to ask three key questions: "Is it clean? Is it vented? Is it drained?" Table 20 verifies that indeed, once fouling is excluded, inadequate venting (12 cases) and inadequate condensate removal (six cases) constitute 18 out of the 31 reported condenser case histories. Other issues do not get close, but may be important in specific situations. These include flooding in or entrainment from partial condensers, especially knock-back condensers, an unexpected heat curve resulting from Rayleigh condensation or presence of a second liquid phase, and maldistribution between parallel condensers.
CONTROLS
Three control malfunctions, each with similar numbers of case histories, 29-33, are in the 14 th , 16 th and 17 th spots in Table 1 : composition control issues, control system assembly difficulties, and condenser and pressure control problems. Table 1 shows that these malfunctions have been equally troublesome in the four decades preceding 1991 as in the last decade. The composition and assembly malfunctions dominate in chemicals and olefins/gas towers, where splits are usually much tighter than between petroleum products in refinery towers. Pressure and condenser control malfunctions dominate in refinery towers. One reason for this is refiners' extensive use of hot vapor bypasses, which can be particularly troublesome (below). Tables 21-23 give a breakdown. There are three major composition control issues. Topping the list (Table 21) , with 17 cases, is finding a suitable temperature control tray. This is followed by achieving successful analyzer controls (12 cases) and obtaining adequate pressure compensation for temperature controls (nine cases). The search for a suitable control tray appears to be less of an issue in the last decade than it had been previously, probably due to the publication of an excellent method by Tolliver and McCune [25] . On the other hand, successful analyzer controls are commonly associated with advanced controls, and have grown in significance in the last decade. Turning to control system assembly difficulties, over half of the reported malfunctions result from violation of three basic synthesis principles (Table 22 ). The first is violation of the material balance control principle. The second is violation of what has become know in some circles as "Richardson's rule" which states [26] "Never control a level on a small stream." The third is attempting to simultaneously control two compositions in a two-product column without decoupling the interference between them. Turning to condenser and pressure control problems (Table 23) , a third of the cases were problems with hot vapor bypasses, practically all in refineries. There is little doubt that this is potentially the most troublesome pressure control method. Most of the problems are due to poor configuration of hot vapor bypass piping, which evolves from poor understanding of its principles. When configured correctly, the author's experience is that hot vapor bypasses are seldom troublesome. Other major items in Table 23 are problems with coolant throttling, which include fouling and instability when throttling cooling water flow, and problems with vapor flow throttling, most of which result from low points that accumulate condensate in vapor lines. 
OVERPRESSURE RELIEF ISSUES
With 24 reported case histories, overpressure relief issues take the 18 th spot in Table  1 . The incidents are evenly split between chemical, refinery and olefins/gas plant towers. There is a slight decline in incidents reported in the last decade compared to the preceding four. Table 24 gives a breakdown. Topping the issues is correctly setting the relief requirements (seven cases). In some cases, small modifications to controls, steam supply, or vacuum breaking gas entry permitted large reduction in relief requirements. In others, towers blew up because their relief capabilities were short of the relief loads. A surprisingly large number of refinery cases (six) reported overpressure in the tower or in downstream equipment due to the unexpected presence of lights or a second liquid phase. Four cases were reported in which hazardous materials were discharged to atmosphere from a relief valve, including hydrocarbon liquids and gases that caught fire. Finally, in three reported cases relief valves were incorrectly set.
THE 10-20 CASE HISTORIES GROUP
Thirteen malfunctions follow, each with 10-20 case histories.
Faulty feed arrangement in tray towers contributed 18 case histories, more from the last decade than the four decades before. Six of these describe maldistribution of feed into multipass trays, mostly in large refinery towers. Four of the cases described feed entries that induced vapor or flashing into downcomers. Chemical towers usually employ one or two pass trays, which are less prone to maldistribution, and therefore report fewer cases of feed malfunctions ( Table 1 ).
Fires that did not lead to explosions were reported in 18 case histories. Six of these were structured packing fires while a tower was open for maintenance during turnaround. In all these fires, pyrophoric or combustible deposits in the packings played a role. These fires damaged the packings, but in a couple, they also damaged the tower shell. Of the six packing fires reported, five took place in refinery towers. Most of these cases were described in an excellent paper by Bouck [27] , which also reviews the chemistry behind these fires and many of the solutions practiced by the industry. Of the remaining fire case histories, three were caused by line fracture, another three by unexpected backflow, two by opening the tower before complete cooling or removal of combustibles, and two others by atmospheric relief that was ignited.
Intermediate component accumulation was troublesome in 17 case histories, evenly split between the last decade and the four preceding decades. A disproportional large number of cases came from olefins and gas plant towers, where hydrates and freeze ups (three cases) resulted from such accumulation. Water accumulation in deethanizers of refineries and gas processing plants contributed five cases. In eight of the case histories, the accumulation led to periodic flooding in the tower. Other problems induced by the accumulation were corrosion (two cases), inability to draw a product stream (three cases), product losses (two cases), and product contamination (two cases).
Chemical releases to the atmosphere from distillation and absorption towers was described in 17 cases. Of these, three were caused by inadvertent venting or draining to the atmosphere, five were caused by unexpected backflow, another three resulted from runaway reactions, cooling water loss or vessel boilover and another three were caused by sudden clearing of trapped chemicals. The numbers of atmospheric releases in the last decade is well below that for the four preceding decades, probably due to the tighter requirements on safety and the environment in recent years.
Subcooling was troublesome in 16 case histories, more in the last decade than in the four preceding decades. In 7 cases, subcooling enhanced internal condensation and reflux, which hydraulically overloaded trays, packing or liquid distributors. In 7 cases, subcooling caused excessive quenching at the inlet zone, diverting light components into the section below with consequent product losses, excessive reboil requirement or component accumulation.
Low liquid loads handling difficulties in tray towers were described in 14 case histories. Practically all of these described one out of two problems: either leakage of liquid from the tray deck, causing the trays to dry out, or vapor breaking into downcomers, causing difficulties (even making it impossible) to establish a downcomer seal. In many cases, inability to seal the downcomer made it impossible for liquid to descend, and led to flooded trays above the unsealed downcomer.
Reboiler and preheater controls were troublesome in 14 case histories. The cases were equally split between refineries and olefins/gas towers. Out of the 14, six involved preheaters, and two involved fired heaters. Temperature control problems with preheaters were common, in most cases due to disturbances in the heating medium or due to vaporization in the feed lines. All the reboiler case histories reported involved a latent-heat heating medium. Hydraulic problems were common when the control valve was in the steam/vapor line to the reboiler, while loss of reboiler condensate seal was common when the control valve was in the condensate lines out of the reboiler.
A second liquid phase, either present where undesirable, or absent where desired, was troublesome in 13 case histories. Most of these came from chemical towers. In 5 cases, a fault in the overhead decanter or its piping caused refluxing of the undesirable phase; in another case, a similar fault caused the undesirable phase to go into the product. In two more cases, a component entering or building up in the system stopped overhead decanter action. In four other cases, the problem was inability to decant a second liquid phase that formed inside the tower.
Heat integration generates complexity and operability issues, which led to 13 case histories. There were also control problems, especially with preheaters, but these are grouped under a different heading in this section. Most of these cases came from refineries and olefins/gas towers, where a high degree of heat integration is practiced. Most of the cases involve the simpler forms of heat integration: multifeed arrangements (four cases), preheaters (three cases), interreboilers (two cases), and recycle loops (two cases). In some of these cases, the fix was as simple as bypassing a stream around the preheater or bypassing a smaller feed stream around the tower.
Poor packing efficiency for reasons other than poor liquid or vapor distribution was reported in 12 cases, mostly recent, evenly split between chemical, refinery and olefins/gas towers. Of the 12, four were because the packed beds were too long. In wash sections of two refinery vacuum towers, this led to drying up and coking; in the other two cases, the long bed gave poor packing efficiency. In four cases, a unique system characteristic, such as high pressure in structured packings, high hydrogen concentration, high viscosity or surface tension, caused the loss of efficiency. The other cases involved corrosion, chipping, and oil layers on packing in aqueous service.
Tray layouts were troublesome in 12 case histories. In three, downcomer inlet areas were short due to either design, assembly, or obstruction by a truss, in two, a restriction occurred at an inlet weir. Other cases described insufficient hole area, incorrect number of passes, undersized manways, poorly designed bottom seal pan, and undefined non-standard design features.
Tray weep was troublesome in 11 reported case histories. Surprisingly, nine of the 11 took place in valve trays, which are inherently more weep-resistant than sieve trays. Most of the problems were cured by blanking or replacing with leak-resistant valve units. The number of weeping case studies in the last decade is well below the number in the previous four decades.
Random packing supports or holddowns were troublesome in 11 case histories. These were split evenly between refinery, chemicals and olefins/gas plant towers, and between the last decade and the four preceding decades. In seven of these, insufficient open area on the support or holddown caused a capacity restriction. In three, packing migrated through the supports. In two, I beams supporting the bed or stiffening the holddown interfered with vapor or liquid distribution.
THE LESSONS LEARNT: AN EPILOGUE
1. Plugging/coking has been, and will continue to be the undisputed leader of tower malfunctions. Coking, scale and corrosion products, and salting out have been the major sources of plugging in refineries, with most coking incidents induced by insufficient wash rates in refinery vacuum towers. In chemical towers, precipitation, solids in feed, polymer, and scale and corrosion products, have been the major sources. The case histories are evenly split between tray and packed towers, with packing distributors and tray active areas the most likely parts to plug (exception: refinery vacuum towers).
2. The tower base and reboiler return region is the most troublesome tower internal. About half the malfunctions were base level exceeding the reboiler return/vapor feed inlet, causing tower flooding, and less frequently, also tray or packing uplift. Faulty base level measurement, restriction in the bottom outlet and excessive kettle pressure drop are the prime causes of the high liquid levels. Of the other malfunctions in this region, vapor maldistribution to a packed bed above and impingement by the entering gas are the most prominent.
3. The leading cause of tower internals damage (excluding fires, explosions and implosions) is water-induced pressure surges in refinery towers. The key to prevention is keeping the water out. Water sources are numerous, the most common being undrained stripping steam lines. The number of water-induced pressure surges has been well down in the last decade. Other common causes of internals damage have been insufficient mechanical resistance, high base liquid level, downward flow through valve rays, and rapid upward flow. Many other causes are not far behind.
4. Malfunctions induced by commissioning, startup, shutdown and abnormal operation are less in the last decade compared to the four preceding decades. Water removal, blinding/unblinding, and backflow are the leading troublespots and account for more than half the case histories. Mishaps while dehydrating refinery fractionators during startups led to many of the pressure surge incidents above. Blinding/unblinding mishaps and backflow caused chemical releases, explosions, fires and personnel injuries during abnormal operation. In the olefins and gas towers, overchilling has been a major issue.
5. Assembly mishaps, identified as the fastest growing malfunction in our previous survey, appear to have leveled off in growth. Mishaps involving liquid distributors lead the list. Incorrect assembly of tray panels, improperly tightened nuts and bolts, obstruction and misorientation at tray feeds and draws, and leaking collector trays have also been troublesome. Some packing assemblies such as dumping of ceramic packings and fastening of grid beds have been troublesome.
6. After the tower base, packing liquid distributors have been the most troublesome tower internal, especially in chemical towers. About half the reported problems involved plugging and overflow. Poor irrigation quality, which is the focus of the literature on the subject, only accounts for about 20% of the distributor malfunctions. The other major causes were fabrication and assembly mishaps and feed entry problems in liquid distributors. Liquid distributor malfunctions have been on the way up in the last decade.
7. Intermediate draws are the third most troublesome tower internal, especially in refinery towers. Intermediate draw malfunctions have been on the way up in the last decade, and are equally split between chimney tray draws and downcomer trapouts (including draw boxes). Leakage at the draw (especially in chimney trays) and restriction or vapor choke of the draw line (especially in downcomer trapouts) were the dominant malfunctions.
8. Misleading measurements, ranging from those leading to minor headaches to those contributing to explosions and accidents, have been troublesome.
Incorrect measurements have been most troublesome, with plugged instrument taps, incorrect location and missing instruments following. In some services, fooling a level measurement by froth, foam or a lighter liquid has been troublesome.
9. Reboiler malfunctions are common with two less common reboiler types: kettle reboilers, where excess pressure drop in the reboiler circuit is the dominant malfunction, and once through reboilers, where leakage at the liquid draw feeding the reboiler is the dominant malfunction. Circulating thermosiphon reboilers, the most common reboiler type, have been relatively trouble-free.
10. Chemical explosions and foaming have been major problems in specific services. Most of the explosions were caused either by a decomposition runaway reaction or by rupture of a line carrying hydrocarbons in the C1 to C4 range. High temperature or concentration of unstable components usually triggered the decomposition.
11. Over half of the foaming incidents were reported in amine or other acid-gas absorbers and regenerators or in hydrocarbon absorbers. In over half the incidents, foaming was promoted by solids, additives, or hydrocarbon condensation into an aqueous solution.
12. Simulations have most frequently gone wrong due to incorrect VLE predictions, poor match of the simulation results to plant data, and lack of graphical checks. Incomplete understanding of the chemistry and poor tray efficiency predictions in new services have also been troublesome. 13 . Leaks in tower heat exchangers and atmospheric leaks have been common, leading to explosions, fires and contamination.
14. Condensers did not work mainly due to inadequate venting or inadequate condensate removal.
15. Finding the best control tray, analyzer control problems, and adequate pressure compensation to temperature controls have been the greatest difficulty experienced with composition control.
16. The main problems experienced with control system assembly have been violation of three basic principles: material balance control, not controlling levels on small streams, and not controlling two compositions simultaneously.
17. The most troublesome condenser and pressure control method have been the hot vapor bypass.
18. Correctly setting the relief requirements, and overpressure due to unexpected presence of lights, have been the major overpressure relief issues.
